
































The political crisis in Moldova 
February 26, 2002  
 
 
On February 24, 2002 the deputies of the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party met in 
Chisinau with their voters. The rally was organized to review the results of the Communist's 
one year governing. At the rally the leaders of the protestors read a list of authorities' 
mistakes and failures, asked for their resignation and early parliamentary elections.  
 
So far, it's hard to imagine that the communists will give up the power so easily. Firstly, they 
were democratically elected and their rating is still very high. Secondly, during the April 
congress communists declared that their victory in elections was a victory of the world 
communist movement, and that their possible failure would be a demoralizing factor for the 
entire world movement. Thirdly, during the congress Moldovan communist leaders warned 
that they are ready to turn Moldova into a European Cuba, if their governing is at threat. It's 
curious that last week, President Voronin insinuated that he is unsatisfied with Strasbourg 
officials, who fail to react to the protest rallies in Chisinau, which they label as illegal.  
 
Also on February 24, 2002 the organization of a referendum on the revocation of the Bashkan 
Dumitru Croitor was thwarted in Gagauz-Yeri. Strangely enough, upon crisis the Gagauz 
leaders, who over the year demonstrated their strategic alliance with separatists in Tiraspol, 
turned for help to Strasbourg, claiming that democratic norms and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Moldova should be observed. The fact was appreciated on the Great National 
Assembly Square, when during the rally Christian-Democrats' leader Iurie Rosca stressed the 
need of solidarity with national minorities in view of promoting democratic values. This was 
the second blow on the minorities' unconditional support to communists, after the leaders of 
the Ukrainian community expressed their doubts about communist authorities' intention to 
declare Russian as a state language.  
 
All those facts greatly damage the governing party's image. Constitutional Court ruling 
outlawing Parliament decision on establishing early parliamentary elections brought to light 
the conflict between the President of the country, who asked for unconditional respect of the 
Court ruling, and the leader of the Communist parliament faction, Victor Stepaniuc, who 
stated that elections will still be conducted. It was obvious for a long time that Voronin and 
Stepaniuc have different points of view. The Presidency recognized that it was a mistake to 
approach in such a thoughtless manner the linguistic and history problems. Though, 
Stepaniuc stated that from a political point of view it is inadmissible to give up the said 
initiatives, even if they triggered the protest rallies. Another illustration of the is the President 
Voronin intention to edify an independent Republic of Moldova State, contested by 
Stepaniuc's participation in the Congress of the NIS Communist Parties where at issue was 
the USSR restoration. And finally last week the new Editor-in-chief of the official newspaper 
Sovereign Moldova claimed that President Voronin intends to build neither communism nor 
socialism. This may demoralize party members who realize that their leaders are preoccupied 
by internal fights and consequently give up their ideals. Indeed, the party program 
specifically provides for the edification of the socialist society based on the Marxist-Leninist 
theory. Still a party scission benefits nobody. Without the support of the parliamentary 
faction, President Voronin found himself in the trap of the parliamentary republic set by his 
predecessor Petru Lucinschi. On the other hand, Communist extremist wing wouldn't be able 
to survive politically without such a leader as Vladimir Voronin.  
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Political crisis is dramatically worsening also due to the fact that candidates to the Finance 
and Economy Ministers were not identified over the last month. The fact that even the so-
called saboteurs refuse to be the scapegoats in the Tarlev Government is an indicator worth 
considering. Representatives of the international financial organizations have already made 
public their concern, as there is nobody to negotiate with the foreign debts and their 
restructuring. That is why, Prime Minister Tarlev himself could be the next victim. His 
resignation would bring new people in Government would deal exclusively with economics. 
Tarlev resignation may be presented as a yield to the protesters. As the political elite is aware 
of a possible financial collapse in the summer, it is very unlikely that it will be satisfied by 
some palliative measures. From this point of view, a possible persecution of the Christian-
Democratic Peoples' Party wouldn't bring any advantages to the governors. The extra-
parliamentary opposition might take the place of the Christian-democrats, asserting itself as 
the third force, which in order to overcome the conflict would call the people to express their 
will in early general elections. The problem is that early elections conducted based on the 
current full proportional system wouldn't clear at all the political situation in the Republic of 
Moldova.  
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Early general local elections were declared unconstitutional 
February 20, 2002  
 
 
During its February 19 session the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova ruled that 
Parliament decision on conducting early general local elections on April 7 is unconstitutional. 
The Court justified its ruling by the fact that by holding general local elections Article 109 of 
the Constitution on the eligibility of the local public administration bodies may be infringed.  
 
Commenting the event, President Vladimir Voronin stated that as a guarantor of the Republic 
of Moldova's sovereignty he calls all the public administration bodies of the country to 
observe Constitutional Court's ruling.  
 
Domestic analysts claim that besides legal grounds for passing such a ruling there were 
political ones as well. Those played a crucial role in blocking the process of restoring soviet-
model local public administration reformed in 1998 - 1999 in compliance with the principles 
of the European Charter "Autonomous exercise of the local power". As a matter of fact, 
representatives of the Council of Europe who visited Moldova as part of the monitoring 
mission of the democratic processes expressed their concern regarding Communist 
authorities' intention to revise the principles of local public self-administration. 
Representatives of the Congress of Local and Regional Governments, a specialized body of 
the Council of Europe, specifically stated which of the Chart provisions would be infringed in 
such a case. Namely, Article 6 of the Charter specifically providing that residents of the local 
communities should be consulted in a referendum on whether they support changes in 
administrative-territorial units' boundaries. Furthermore, the delegation stated that 
termination before the term of the elected officials' mandate is a violation of the contract 
between the voters and the bodies they elect.  
 
Political situation in the Republic of Moldova has been worsening continuously since January 
9, 2002 when non-stop protest actions against the policies promoted by the Communist 
governing party were launched. A series of non-governmental organizations protested against 
the introduction of compulsory Russian lessons in the primary schools (despite the lack of 
support materials or failure to consult the parents); the replacement of the History of 
Romanians course with the History of Moldova; as well as the censure at the national TV and 
radio stations, etc.  
 
In mid February the number of participants in the daily protests ranged from 10.000 to 30.000 
people. The protestors headed by the leader of the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party have 
gradually changed their claims, transforming the protests into a movement against communist 
authorities. Now the protestors claim the resignation of the Communists and general 
elections.  
 
Protests in Chisinau are unfolding in parallel with another conflict in Gagauz-Yeri, triggered 
by the control conducted by the Court of Accounts in Gagauz-Yeri. The latter lead to a 
scission in the Gagauz-Yeri General Assembly, which started the procedure of dismissing the 
Bashkan, Dumitru Croitor. Obviously, the political conflict unfolding in the South of the 
Republic of Moldova may result in a greater ethnical conflict. Gagauz authorities would like 
to pretend that is not the issue of embezzlement at stake, but rather a fight between Gagauz 
authorities and those Chisinau, which attempt to infringe their autonomy.  
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Moreover, communist authorities are not in good terms with the neighborhood countries, 
Romania and Ukraine, the former being blamed of interfering in the internal affairs of 
Moldova, the second of favoring smuggling from Transdnistria, failing to comply with the 
new customs regulations of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Under those circumstances early local elections might have had unforeseeable impact, that is 
why Constitutional Court's ruling is a very elegant way to back out from early local elections 
without damaging communists' image. On the contrary, President Voronin stated that he 
would defend the constitutional order in the country. It is true that the President's councilor 
foresaw such a development, blaming the Parliament majority and the Government for the 
current political crisis.  
 
Meanwhile the Christian Democrats may celebrate their first victory. However, given the fact 
that early local elections are not being held, they will have to change their message. No 
doubt, Christian-democrats won't give up their strategic offensive against communist 
authorities. On the other hand, authorities may claim that by giving up early local elections 
they complied with domestic and international norms, thus illustrating how a deadlock may 
be  overcome. They will insist Christian-Democrats to follow their example and give up 
theillegal protests. Consequently, it is difficult to predict the future developments. One thing 
is clear, communists intend to hold a referendum to consult the citizens on all the issues that 
triggered the deadlock. It is very unlikely that the protesters will agree.  
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2002 Local Elections 
February 12, 2002  
 
 
On February 5, 2002 the Parliament set the date for early general elections - April 7, 2002. 
During its first session held on February 7, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) adopted 
a resolution on establishing 37 electoral districts (in 32 rayons, in 3 municipalities - Chisinau, 
Balti, Bender; in Gagauz-Yeri Administrative Territorial Unit; and in Transdnistria). Under 
the Electoral Code provisions Rayon Electoral Commissions shall establish District Electoral 
Commissions and about 1700 precincts.  
 
CEC made public the list of parties and other socio-political organizations entitled to run in 
elections. The CEC also adopted sample voter rolls and petitions for the registration of 
independent candidates. Furthermore, CEC estimated the budget for the local elections, 
which is to be approved by the Parliament.  
 
So far, the creation of two very strong electoral blocs has been made public. "Serafim 
Urechean" Electoral Bloc includes 10 political parties: Party of Rebirth and Reconciliation 
(headed by Mircea Snegur), Independents' Alliance (Serafim Urechean), Party of Democratic 
Forces (Valeriu Matei), Social Liberal Union "Moldovan Force" (Veaceslav Untila), etc. The 
second electoral bloc Social Democratic Alliance of Moldova is formed of the Social 
Democratic Union (Dumitru Braghis) and Democratic Party (Dumitru Diacov).  
 
The leader of the Social Liberal Party, Oleg Serebrean, called other political parties to 
boycott the early general local election on the grounds that they are a "political farce and a 
trap to democracy".  
 
Given the launch of the electoral campaign, the Minister of Justice decided to cancel his 
decision on suspension of  
the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party (PPCD) activity, so as not to breach the rights of the 
party supporters.  
Other political parties claim that early elections are unnecessary and represent an abuse from 
behalf of the Communist parliamentary majority. Representatives of the Congress of Local 
and Regional Powers of the Council of Europe stated that Moldovan authorities breached the 
provisions of the European Charter "Autonomous Exercise of the Local Power", when they 
modified the administrative-territorial division of the Republic of Moldova without 
previously consulting the communities during a referendum. Also, the communists ended the 
4-year mandate of the local authorities, which was due to expire in May 2003.  
 
In accordance with the modified Law on Local Public Administration mayors will be elected 
indirectly. They will be designated by at least 1/3 of elected councilors and will be elected by 
the majority vote of the elected councilors.  
In addition other modifications have been operated to the Electoral Code reducing electoral 
campaigns to two months (previously 3 months).  
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Is a social pact possible in the Republic of Moldova? 
March 27, 2002  
 
 
In an interview offered to the Nezavisimaia Moldova governmental newspaper on March 15, 
President Vladimir Voronin pointed that the Republic of Moldova "lacks efficient democratic 
mechanisms, allowing a permanent dialog with the society". In order to initiate the dialog the 
President held meetings with journalists, trade unions, NGOs, ethnic minorities, etc, with 
whom "he should effectuate a Social Pact". The President views the social pact as the first 
step towards "building civil society", which in its turn would ensure citizens consensus on a 
certain "ethic-moral" order.  
 
On March 20, Moldova Suverana and Nezavisimaia Moldova governmental newspapers 
published the Appeal of the President Voronin: "On the Social Pact". Various non-
governmental organizations, trade unions, etc praised the President's initiative, all the same it 
was viewed with suspicion. Firstly, during his one year governing the President was very 
prolific in launching various initiatives, which proved to be unfinished (such as fighting 
corruption, recovery of the economy real sector, settling Transdnistrian conflict, edifying a 
Moldovan nation, etc). Secondly, from the very beginning the President made clear that he 
won't dialogue with other political parties, whose leaders he views as "failed politicians". 
Though, political parties are the ones involved in the political conflict unfolding in the 
Republic of Moldova. And last but not least, presidential message points the need to dialogue 
only with the so-called "healthy forces". This "healthy forces" phrase raises a series of 
questions. As political parties and non-partisan organizations are legal entities registered by 
the Ministry of Justice in compliance with the constitutional right to free association, who 
may assume the right to decide which of them are "healthy" and which aren't? What are the 
criteria for selecting "health forces"? Probably, the President intended to let citizens 
themselves decide which are the unhealthy forces. He just pointed what are in his opinion the 
destabilizing factors for the Republic of Moldova: geopolitical interests of other states; poor 
economic situation; territorial disintegration of the Republic of Moldova; Western and 
Eastern unionism; and the gap between public officers and society. It seems that the major 
obstacle in eliminating those destabilizing factors is the Communist Party itself, headed by 
President Voronin, rather than the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition.  
 
Obviously the Communist Party strives to prove the contrary. Communist Party leaders 
continuously accuse Romania for "interfering in the Republic of Moldova affairs" in order to 
undermine the Republic of Moldova statehood. According to the Moldovan officials Romania 
interferes by allowing Moldovan young people to study in Romania, consequently they are 
"more indoctrinated than educated", as well as by supporting Bessarabian Church. Though, 
Romania on every occasion reiterates that it recognizes the independence of the Republic of 
Moldova and is ready to support Moldova in its efforts to joint the European Union in the 
future. Out of all domestic political parties, the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party (CDPP) 
is the only one accused of undermining Republic of Moldova statehood on the grounds that 
for the last decade it has advocated unification of the Republic of Moldova and Romania. It is 
known for a fact that the rating of the CDPP has never exceeded 10%. Also, during the VI-th 
Congress held on December 11, 1999, CDPP adopted a new political program whose major 
goals are "achieving national unity based on Christian morality" and "Republic of Moldova 
adhesion to the European Union in the foreseeable future". It seems there are no grounds for  
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political confrontations. Firstly, after the parliamentary elections of February 25, 2001 the 
Communist Party holds the constitutional majority - 71% seats in Parliament. Secondly, the 
Government voted by the Communists adopted in January the "Strategy for the Republic of 
Moldova development in the mid-term future", which also provides establishing a favorable 
environment for the Republic of Moldova joining EU. What is then the reason for 
destabilizing the political situation in the country?  
 
Opposition parties claim that the Communist Party is a revanchist political party exploiting 
people's nostalgia for a secure life in electoral campaigns, but unable to modernize the 
society. According to them this is the major destabilization factor. The current political 
situation when Communists chase "unhealthy forces" is a screen hiding the governors' 
political and economic incompetence. As for destabilizing factors mentioned by President 
Voronin, the opposition points that:  
 
 
1. Only one country has openly declared that it has geopolitical interests in this region 
(i.e. Russia viewed by the Communist Party as the main strategic partner of the 
Republic of Moldova);  
2. Tiraspol separatist leaders justify the existence of the unconstitutional breakaway 
separatist region to the left of Dniester by the need to represent Russia's interests in 
the Balkans (according to them Transdnistria a Russian land);  
3. Poor economic situation of the Republic of Moldova is due to the reluctance of the 
Communist Party and its strategic ally, Democratic Agrarian Party, which governed 
between 1992 and 1998, to promote economic reforms;  
4. It is a nonsense to accuse a political party accounting only for 10% of the seats in 
Parliament of undermining Republic of Moldova statehood, when the governing party 
itself has the following provision in its political program adopted in April 2001: "The 
Communist Party is the full rights member of the Union of the Communist Parties and 
views its consolidation as a binding political condition for the reconstruction on a 
voluntary and renewed basis of the Federation of the Sovereign Republics having 
equal rights, i.e. URSS;  
5. And finally the instability generated by the split between the governors and society 
may be overcome only if the governing party manifests political will.  
 
Given the above said, there are a series of problems awaiting resolution before a "Social 
Pact" may be achieved. First of all, the credibility of the governing party should be restored, 
as there is a huge difference between their declarations and actions, and during their one-year 
governing they made a series of mistakes which triggered the current crisis in Moldova.  
 
At his meeting with representatives of non-governmental organizations, on March 22 
President Voronin admitted that he wasn't aware of the existence of a permanent framework 
for discussions between NGOs and public authorities. Such a framework is provided during 
National NGO Forum, conducted periodically once in two years since 1997, and where 
public authorities are permanently invited. During the three editions of the NGO Forum the 
latter were present only with greeting messages. It is not a surprise then, that under those 
circumstances any dialogue is blocked. It seems that the same holds true for trade unions, 
religious organizations, and political parties. Hearings at the European Court of Human 
Rights, the last Congress of the Businessmen, critics voiced by the political parties, trade 
unions' protests - all those events are another illustration to the above said.  
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In his appeal, Voronin is concerned about the lack of "efficient democratic mechanisms, 
allowing a permanent dialogued with the society". Journalists claim that a public audiovisual 
institution broadcasting on the entire territory of the country could be the best mechanism in 
this respect. Some high-rank officials accused TV journalists on strike of partisanship and 
lack of professionalism. Nevertheless the entire society witnessed how since the victory of 
the Communist Party, the National TV Station (funded from the state budget) has been 
broadcasting ideology reports about pioneer and comsomol organizations, etc and ignored to 
cover topical issues. That is why, freeing National TV and Radios Stations from censure and 
ideology as demanded by journalists on strike, as well as turning "Teleradio Moldova" State 
Company into a real public audiovisual institution, would prove authorities' willingness to 
reopen the dialogue with the society.  
 
Political Parties, on the other hand, claim that it is the Communist Party doctrine (Marxism - 
Leninism) which blocks the dialogue, as it runs counter to the civil society values: pluralism 
of ideas, competition of values, etc. Given the difference between the values shared by the 
Communist Party and civil society, a social dialogue might have a chance if the mediator, i.e. 
the President of the country, will give up the position of Chairman of the Communist Party. 
Though, the President indicated that he wouldn't do this. Under those circumstances, the 
President may want to initiate a reform of the party he is heading, turning it into a social-
democratic orientation, as was recommended by the writer Ion Drutsa.  
 
Analysts claim that the current political crisis in the Republic of Moldova was triggered by 
the Communists' decision to make use of the constitutional majority they hold and try to 
"decree the truth" with regard to very sensitive issues such as language and history. They 
claim that citizens' right to ethnic self-identification prevails in societies split on linguistic 
criteria, such as the Moldovan society.  
 
And finally, another obstacle to social dialogue is the fact that President Voronin sees 
strengthening Republic of Moldova's independence in fostering "state patriotism". The notion 
of "state patriotism" introduces a deliberate confusion of the "Motherland" and "state" and it 
is a very strange one. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the example of Alexandr 
Soljenitsin, whom President Voronin greatly respects. Indeed, one could hardly question Mr. 
Soljenitsin patriotism, despite the fact that he questioned the essence of a Communist state, 
for which he was expelled from the country.  
 
Analysts who doubt the success of a Social Pact, point out that economic situation of the 
Republic of Moldova and authorities' tolerance toward their opponents' opinions are the 
major factors, which could contribute to the strengthening of the Republic of Moldova 
statehood. An evidence of progresses in this respect would be the best step in reopening a 
dialogue between the power and society.  
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Could a referendum settle a political crisis? 
March 5, 2002  
 
 
Political crisis in the Republic of Moldova has attained a new dimension this week. After 
protesters' march to the Teleradio Moldova State Company, about 400 company employees 
declared a Japanese strike in protest to the censure established by the authorities at the 
National Radio and TV Stations. Journalists' act might have a great impact as their 
accusations of censure are related to the violation of the constitutional principles regarding 
the human rights.  
 
Supreme Court of Justice ruling outlawing protest rallies determined authorities to resume 
threatening organizers of the rallies for involving children in the. The problem is that the 
protesters headed by Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD) leaders haven't done 
anything that the communists didn't do. Last year the Communists were the ones to engage 
kids in politics by establishing pioneer and Comsomol organizations in schools. During a live 
TV show last week Dumitru Braghis, leader of a parliament faction, brought about this fact 
when he scolded Victor Stepaniuc, leader of the Communist faction in Parliament. From this 
perspective, authorities cannot fulfil their threats.  
 
The authorities and official press qualify the current situation as "the social peace and order 
have been partially lost for the moment". That is why the idea of a referendum, which "would 
put an end to the attempts of those who aim to destroy the Moldovan state" seems to recur 
lately. A problem arises here as well. There is no political party in the Republic of Moldova, 
which would dispute in its bylaws the existence of a Moldovan state in the long run. It was 
the Communist party to be the last one to exclude from its bylaws such an objective, whose 
achievement would have meant loosing the independence of the Republic of Moldova. It was 
only last year during the April congress, that the governing party adopted a new program, 
which does not refer to the party membership in the Union of Communist Parties of the 
Community of Independent States (UCPCIS), whose goal is to rebuild the URSS. 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party is still a member of the UCPCIS. Furthermore, Moldovan 
Communists took part in the last UCPCIS congress in October, where at issues was the 
fulfillment of the strategic goal, i.e. rebuilding USSR. This happened after President 
representatives stated in August that "any discussion on the independence of the Republic of 
Moldova may be considered as undermining of the state". From this perspective the latest 
actions of the governing party seem more like self-conviction. Indeed, the Communist Party 
accuses European institutions of applying double standards, when it itself is not so much 
different.  
 
As for the referendum itself, there are several issues to be considered. Firstly, authorities need 
a political will to initiate such a referendum. In compliance with the electoral law, a 
referendum may be initiated by a group of at least 300 citizens. Then 200,000 signatures need 
to be collected. Also, a referendum may be initiated by 1/3 of the deputies in Parliament, and 
by the President of the country. It is very unlikely that the President would accept to initiate 
such a referendum. A referendum may be lost as well, and General Charles De Gaulle's 
example - resigning after initiating and loosing a referendum - is an eloquent illustration. The 
example has been used since to represent how respect for its own people is manifested.  
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As it takes a long time for the citizens to initiate a referendum, it seems that the only ones left 
to do the job are the Parliament deputies. Though this conclusion doesn't help too much. To 
initiate a referendum, questions subject to the referendum should be clearly formulated. So 
far, we could only assume what will be the questions subject to referendum. Constitutional 
Court reject to examine issues related to declaring Russian as the second state language. 
Issues related to the history study or patriotism would seem too exaggerated for referendum 
questions. So, it would take a while to just properly formulate the questions. Noteworthy, the 
Parliament may establish referendum date only six months after initiating it and the 
referendum is to be conducted two months later. However, general local elections are due 
next spring. And if a referendum is held in spring, under the electoral law elections may be 
held only 4 months later.  
 
It is very unlikely that by the time referendum date is set Transdnistrian authorities will agree 
to a referendum on left bank of Dniester. It is also unclear whether Gagauz citizens will take 
part in the referendum, given continuously worsening relations between Chisinau and 
Comrat. The fact that polling places were destroyed during the February 24 referendum held 
to oust the incumbent Bashkan (Governor) proves that such a scenario may not be excluded. 
Under given circumstances the legality of referendum results may not be ensured.  
 
Furthermore, the current economic situation does not allow Moldova to engage in a half a 
year electoral marathon, with a national referendum and elections. In addition, the authorities 
are committed to conduct a national census in October, which also requires quite an amount 
of money. And given the unrest in the society the situation gets very complicated.  
 
This being said, we could only agree with the official press, namely the major 
accomplishment of the governing party has been overcoming syndromes and shocks. Thus, 
since their victory in February 25, 2001 elections, Communist have been trying to overcome 
"opposition syndrome", whereas now they are undergoing through another extreme "shocks 
of their electoral performances" (71 mandates in Parliament). Under those circumstances, 




Referendum on the modification of the electoral system 
April 29, 2002  
 
 
Political confrontation of the last three months between the Communist governing and 
Christian-Democrat opposition reached the stage when the Resolutions of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe could be enforced. Otherwise, both the power and 
opposition have much to loose. In his appeal to the protestors in the Town of Freedom the 
leader of the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party, Iurie Rosca stated that the protest rallies 
would cease immediately he and Victor Stepaniuc draft an agreement on the enforcement of 
the resolutions passed in Strasbourg.  
 
It might seem that the settlement of the political crisis, in which both the power and 
opposition claim to be the winners, is so close. Indeed, what the Christian-Democrats 
achieved is that the power undertook to enforce the objectives the opposition was pursuing 
for many years. The Communist governing got out of the crisis more consolidated, with an 
extremely high rating, and more importantly, having a reasonable excuse for not fulfilling 
their electoral promise. The image of the constructive opposition and that of the extra-
parliamentary opposition is very shabby under current circumstances.  
 
Nevertheless, one may foresee new confrontations, but this time between governing party and 
constructive opposition, led by the former Prime Minister Dumitru Braghis, incumbent leader 
of the Social Democrat Alliance. Last week the Central Electoral Commission registered an 
initiative group formed out of 608 persons, which intends to conduct this fall a legislative 
referendum on a new electoral system for parliamentary and local elections. The leaders of 
the initiative group recommend that 50% of the deputies be elected on party lists in a national 
constituency, whereas the rest 50% in uninominal constituencies. As for the election of 
county councilors the initiative group recommends a majority system.  
 
Until mid-July members of the initiative group should collect 200,000 signatures in support 
of their initiative, which then would have to be verified by the CEC. Only then, the 
Parliament would decide to declare or not a referendum for this fall.  
 
It is important to understand what are the grounds for initiating a referendum. There is no 
doubt that the leaders of the initiative group could bring a lot of arguments in support of 
changing the current electoral system.  
 
The arguments are related firstly, to the fact that the system of closed party lists complied by 
the party leaders guided by some obscure and non-transparent criteria, boost corruption and 
result in scandals and scissions within the parties. Secondly, opinion polls indicate that the 
great majority of the population disapproves the current proportional electoral system due to 
the fact that it does not allow for a strong relationship between voters and deputies. Another 
draw back of current system is the fact that 70% of the incumbent deputies represent party 
elite from the capital. And finally, the previous three electoral campaigns conducted based on 
the proportional system didn't led to a strong party system, on the contrary the permanent 
games of increasing the threshold of representation has led to the collapse of the political 
center. The abusive increase of the threshold of representation reduces the effects of 
proportional representation, and generates distortions. Thus during the last elections in  
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addition to the 50 mandates it received, Communist party got another 20, which is more than 
the total number of mandates received by the Braghis Alliance, the second largest 
parliamentary faction.  
 
Further, the leaders of the initiative group cite the advice of the writer, Ion Drutsa, given as a 
reply to President Voronin's open letter of January 17. Ion Drutsa replied to the President 
after two months by recommending among others to change the electoral system. It is 
believed that the governmental newspaper republished Ion Drutsa's letter only to disguise 
Voronin's disappointment and to exclude the possibility of other newspapers publishing it 
first. Anyway after the response was published no actions were undertaken. Now, the 
constructive opposition may ask the President of the country - what's the use of addressing 
for advice to someone known to be "a master of founding and building" when the advice is 
ignored?  
 
Another illustration to the fact is the Communist newspaper's criticism over the referendum 
idea. The newspaper accuses the initiative group of readiness to buy the voters' signatures. 
Further, the authors point that a possible change of the electoral system might have similar 
effects to those in Ukrainian parliamentary elections, when voters' option in favor of Victor 
Iushenko's bloc was annihilated by the presidential administration. Allegedly, the latter 
resorted to administrative levers to determine the candidates elected in uninominal districts to 
adhere to the pro-presidential faction, which on the contrary enjoyed a meager voters' support 
at the national level, only the third place.  
 
Noteworthy, Christian-Democratic opposition is also dissatisfied with a change of the 
electoral system. In the last 8 years Christian-Democrats enjoyed a steady rating ranging from 
7 - 10%. The statistics indicates that it is very unlikely Christian-Democrat candidates would 
receive the majority of votes in uninominal constituencies, consequently a possible mixed 
system might substantially diminish Christian-Democrats performance in elections.  
 12
The relationships between authorities and opposition after three months of protests 
April 22, 2002  
 
 
The events produced last week mark a new stage in the relationships between the power and 
opposition. After more than three months of opposition protest rallies on the one hand, and 
threats to the protesters on the other, the leaders of the majority and those of the protesting 
opposition, Iurie Rosca and constructive-conciliation opposition Dumitru Braghisr, decided 
to initiate a dialogue.  
 
It seems that the transition from confrontation to dialogue was induced by two major events. 
Firstly, the meetings all three parliament faction leaders had in Strasbourg with Walter 
Shwimmer, General Secretary of Council of Europe in order to identify ways of settling the 
crisis. Secondly, last week Institute of Public Policies released the results of an opinion poll. 
The results indicate that Christian-Democrats preserve their rating, and this despite the fact 
that they had been in the spotlight the last couple of months. On the other hand, the same poll 
indicates that the rating of the Communist Party has considerably increased, reaching almost 
70 %. Although comprising more than 20 parties, the so-called "political center" is absent 
from the top of voters' preferences. The strongest centrist party - Social Democratic Alliance 
headed by the former Prime Minister, Dumitru Braghis, is supported by only 3% of the 
voters.  
 
Both events, the meeting in Strasbourg and poll results, have resulted in a change of attitude 
of the faction leaders. The leader of the Communist faction, Victor Stepaniuc, admitted in 
front of the journalists that since their last year victory Communists have undertaken some 
clumsy measures. Stepaniuc's attitude reminded of a scolded child, who promised to learn the 
rules of a decent political behavior. It is worth pointing out that as a result in the last two 
weeks the Communists proved to be extremely zealous. They assured the opposition that they 
would provide them access to national television and radio and would change the procedure 
of lifting the deputies' immunity. Further, they sent for the expertise of the Council of Europe 
a series of recently passed legal acts, even though the latter didn't asked them to.  
 
On the other hand, the leader of Christian-Democrats, Iurie Rosca has smoothly turned from 
demands on Government resignation and early parliamentary elections to providing public 
lessons on democracy to Communists. The CDPP leader reiterated in front of the journalists 
and their cameras, the abuses and offences on democracy made by the Communist governing, 
namely right to freedom of thought, censure, suppressing independence of the judiciary and 
local public administration. He noted that a true democracy could not rely on the goodwill of 
the authorities that promise not to commit abuses, rather it should rely on a set of laws aimed 
to prevent the abusive behavior of the authorities. In this respect, Rosca indicated that the 
judiciary branch in the Republic of Moldova is serving the authorities, that is why they had to 
appeal in the European Court on Human Rights the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice on 
the illegality of protest rallies. CDPP leader believes that it is inappropriate to cease the 
protest rallies, as long as the factors, which brought the people on the street, are not 
eliminated. So, the political duel in which Christian-Democrats will be in offensive and 
Communists in defensive would continue.  
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No doubt, the way the current political crisis is unfolding leaves the impression that the 
Republic of Moldova is an entropic system, whose normal state is necessarily a certain 
degree of political chaos. Fortunately this entropic system is dissipative, and the influence of 
external factors is decisive. In this respect the session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, scheduled for April 24, on the state of democratic institutions in the Republic of 
Moldova will have a decisive impact on the power - opposition relationship. Further, despite 
the fact that the results of the latest opinion poll favor Moldovan Communists, the recent 
developments in Russia and Ukraine, where Communists suffered a great loss, illustrate that 
the red horizons are far and far away.  
 
The officials of the international monetary institutions who recently visited the Republic of 
Moldova indicated that they might resume crediting Moldova this summer. This would open 
the possibility of spreading out payments or even canceling foreign debts. Thus, the 
Communist "Titanic" might avoid he collision with the iceberg called default. For this to 
happen, the navigation course tailored according to the party program, adopted exactly one 
year ago on April 22, need to be replaced by another one tailored according to the coordinates 
set by the Council of Europe and other international institutions.  
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